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HE last two years have been any-thing bunt
tranqsnil for tine U.S. econonnsy, Insterest rates, for
exansiple, has-c be-ems hsigls assel yolatile-. Twice dumrinsg
tisis period tisey rose td) record levels-. thsec prissse rate
hsit2O percemst in April 1980, tile-n rose to 21.5 percent
ins Jantnary 1981. Two reeessiomss have oc’ctnrrecei
during thsis briefperiod, one ofwhich apparently still
hinsgers. Signsificcant finanscial chansges hayec takecns
place withs ams insflunx of deposits imito usonsey nssarket
nsscntunal funds ansci ans ountflosy fronn small tinsse mine1
sax’ings clecpnsits - Tise nsaticinswicle legalizatiens of
NOV7 accotensts ins early 1981 also re-semIte-cl inn mc siz-
able realieseatiots cnf funnels - Amssid all of’ these cieye-l—
opnseists, money growth also has be-eu epnite yolatile.
Should thse s~enlatiI itv ofshort—run usiomsey groxs’tls lie
a nssatter of eonseerms?Tlsere appear to lie two ehistinsct
schools of tlsocnght with regard to tls is qunestion - One
selsool argcnecs that snnch volatility is nscit re-ally a
prnble-mns. It holds thsmet ‘‘tlsec mmccci for 1sreeisec shsort—runns
nssone-y sunpplv control is tee-lsnicah ly questiossable.’’l
Tue othecr selsool argsnecs that such yolatility elannage-s
tisec eccinsonniv. lor exansple, M iltoms Frieelnsams, ins
evalu natins g mnonsetarv p0 hey ox-er tise last eounple of
ecars hsas written that ‘‘the yo—y-o swimsgs ins nnomietarv
growth alfe-ctecd tbse e-cnnsonuy- chirectls-, as well as
through mite-rest rates - E mccii sunrgec ins nsieisse-tary’
growth 55-mIs feslloxs’eel after sounse- nnnonsths h~ass mte—
celeration ins spendable incomn e, enutput amsel ecnsi—
ploymecnt; anwi each dcccl imse ins momietary growth, by
a re tarciatiou - ‘2
Sonnsexx’hsmtt surprisingly’, thsec two schools des midst
ehsagree about theoretical issunes. Bciths selsools -agree
that, ins theory, tise- decsirahihity of stabihizinsg short—
runns rnousecv grosvtls clepensds ons the stability- of the
puhhic’s densuansd for mssonev. Aehsievinsg stable nssonse
growths hemseflts tbsc eceononsy onsly if tise pumhhic’s
elennsmtnsel for nnnomsecy dines nsot ehansge unnnecxpe-cteccllv.
The issue that separates tlsec two schoois oftlsoughst
is ehsiecfhy ans e-nspirical onse hsmus nuonsey clennanncl lice-ni
re-asonmnlsb y s tmchile P Tisose who argune that the ‘olmi—
tilift of slsort—rcnns monecy greiwtls ins thsec past has nsot
bee-n mu prohslenss hoTel tlsmtt usouev demansci has lie-ens
snbjeete-d to mc series of tnmspreelictable shifts. Ac-—
con-dinsg to this n’easomsinsg, hscsIdinsg tlsec rate of nsseinsev
growths ins mc tigist hmusd would have inssposecel sig—
,siflemcnst e-essts ccii tise ecconsnnsy. Suppose. for examssple,
the public wants to hcdid lmuge-r mnmc~nseybalmcmnces - If’
sneechs a precferecnsce is thwarted by an mcelherenicec ted
pre—estabh ishse-d msscnmsetary tmcrgets, the econseimsi y
xvcnunld he sunidjectecel tes unmseccessary recstrainst. Imnehi—
yiehuuals sececkiusg ten hinnild thsecir nnsonney halms.nsces xxii I
recelcnce- thsecir clennsauei for gcsoeis -and se-ryiees’amsei
finanscial assets, resenltinng ins mcmi ecddnsonsicslowdown -
‘l’he otlner se-hsool mergunes that nssonnev eheussmnnseh has
hceccns hsasic’mcily stmcisle. Ins this yiew, mns Frieclmann
eomstenscls, rapid nssomse-e groxvtls cdyen’stinssunlates the-
ccc’esnscdnssy, unitimsuate-ly e’auesins g insflatiecns, xviii Icc slnug—
gish nssonecv greswths inspose-s sendinec re-s traint.
~\hiItccss Frieeltsnmuns_ he- Ye,—Yes Eeesnennssy,’ Xe-ne-snee’c-k lEe—inrenmery
15,1982). Aisen, dccc Multents Frieccinsnann, ‘‘TIne Ee-e!e-’rmul h-Ic-sc-ms-c- anne
1
Nlcnnmetmerv Inscmcmelcihitv.’’ Uee// Ste-c-em /ccsentds(. Eelnrnmerv 5, 1982.
iStc~phnenn II. :~xiIrecei mind Iismyici B. Lindsey, ‘F’eeie’rmel Bc’sc-rycc
Ss-stc—un lnnsn,Iensse-nstsnticnns ccl \Ieune-tmury Fcehic-vs _Annselytieseh Eecesns—
ehmeticmnss ccl the- Net’,- A~sprccmeehs.’’/ts,eec-,ic-cese Ecccseeennsie Re-e,ene-
mdcper—c else e/ Price csd/i, sr-c ) M mn’ 198 II- p - 252. Alccc, se-c- Ce cc rge’
MeKimnnnev, ir., “‘risc’ Nsetnse’ enl time- Csensse,’’ /Tceeetccn,efe lie—ne foctee
dune ‘eVe!! St,-e’e’( (F’e-Ismoserv 26. 1982).
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This article examines the evidence to determine
whether money demand behavior overthe last two
years has beenerratic enoughtojusti& the observed
volatility in money growth,
MONEY GROWTH AND THE DEMAND
FOR MONEY
Chart 1 providesevidenceon short-mn (quarterly)
money growth volatility. The chart plots, for each
quartersince11/1962, quarterly money growth (at an
annual rate) less the average ofmoney growth over
the prior 12 quarters. Thus, for example, the —2.0
percentreading for 111/1962 shows thatmoneygrew
2 percentage points less in that quarter than its
average growth rate in the previous three years.
The volatility shown in this charthastwo different
dimensions. One dimension is simply the magni-
tude ofthe deviation fromtrend. Forexample, in the
third quarter of 1980, money grew at a rate 8 per-
centage points above trend, the largest positive
deviation in the last 20 years. Inthe second quarter
of 1980, money grew at a rate over 10 percentage
pointsbelow trend,thelargestnegativedeviation in
the last20 years. Thus, according to such ameasure,
money growth has been quite volatile over the last
two years.
The second dimension is thefrequency with
which deviationsofmoney growth relative to trend
change signs. The chart shows that money growth
relative to trend frequentlyhas changed sign from
positiveto negative, andvice versa,over the lasttwo
years.This fluctuationstands in sharpcontrastto the
historical norm whereby money growth usually is
above or below trend for several quarters in a row.
Thus, theincreased frequencyofchange ofquarterly
money growth relative to trend also supports the
view thatmoney growth over the last two years has
been volatile.
The increased volatility in money growth alone
does not demonstrate that the demand for money
was unstable. Such aconclusion implicitlyholds that
thegrowthofthe nominal moneystockiscompletely
demand-determined, ignoring completely the ac-
tions taken by monetary authorities. Since monetary
authorities can change bank reserves, reserve re-
quirements or the discount rate, It is entirely pos-
sible thatchanges in nominal money growth reflect
theiractions, insteadofshifts in the public’s desired
money holdings. In other words, monetary author-
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ities “can ‘create’ a product without necessarily
being limited by the demand for it?” Thus, one
should not necessarily interpret changes in money
growth as shifts in money demand.
A CONVENTIONAL MONEY DEMAND
EQUATION AND THE EVIDENCE
OF SHIFTS
One can analyze money demand on a more so-
phisticated basis by using econometric techniques.
Thisarticle provides no newanalysis on this topic;
instead it describes how such evidence can be
evaluated.
Economic theory holds thatnominal money bal-
ances relative to the general price level (generally
called “real”moneybalances)are the relevantquan-
tity measure for demand analysis Oust as standard
demand theory explains the demand for physical
goods and services, not the dollar value of those
goodsand services). Thus,when one focuses onreal
money,one recognizesthatthe usefulness ofmoney
clearlydepends on the price ofgoods and services.
For example, if the quantity of money that people
hold remains unchanged while the average price of
goods and services fall, a given stock ofmoney will
have greatervalue; thatis,itwillpennitthepurchase
ofmore goods and services. Thus, the economically
meaningful measure is the money stock relative to
the average price of goodsand services.4
Analysts commonly hypothesize that real money
balances move opposite to a change in market in-
terest rates and in tandem with a change in real
income. Achange in marketinterest rates negatively
affects the demand for real balances, because it
represents the opportunitycost ofholding money.If
market interest rates rise, individuals forgo more
interest income by holding money and thus are ex-
pectedto desireless moneybalances. Asreal income
rises, however, individuals will want larger real
money balances to purchase more goods and serv-
ices. Thus, a change in real income is expected to
haveasimilareffectondesired realmoney balances.
‘Stephen H. Axilrod, “Monetary Policy, Money Supply, and the
Federal Reserve’s Operating Procedures,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (Jannaiy 1982), p. 13.
Fora discussion ofthe interpretation ofcbanges in reat balances,
see A.t Balbachand Denis S. Karnoslcy, “Real Money Balances:
A Good Forecasting Device and a Good Policy Target?” this
Review (September 1975), pp. 11-IS.FEDERAL RESERVE SANKOF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1982
Chart 1
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lo empirically investigate the demand for nioney,
the relationship between real money balances (M/
P)~ and current interest rates (it), real income (yr), and
lagged real balances (M/P)11, is estimated using
multiple regression analysis. The equation to be
estimated is typically written as:
(1) fM/P)1 /p + ~1i1 fI2~
+ ~3(M/P2 +
The coefficients fifl. fly.$~ and ~ show how desired
real money balances respond to changes in the re-
spective independent variables. The residual, El, is
assumed to be a random ranuble that fluctuates
about zero. Itrepresents the unexplained variation of
actual real money balances from that predicted by
the combination of the estimated regression coeffi-
cients and the values ofthe independent variables.
Last periods real balances are usuall included in
empirical estunations of nmnev demand to capture
an assumed adjustment process. Because of relevant
transaction costs of adjusting real mone balances, it
is usually presumed that actual balances only slowly
adjust to desired levels. The lagged value of real
balinices is included to capture such an adjustment
process. By including lagged real money hahuices in
the equation, we are assuming actual real balances
only partially adjust to current changes in interest
rates or real income.
A common procedure used in evaluating the
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t
This proecdiire apparel it] Y date s hack to Steph ciI NI - Gold id (I,
‘‘The Case of the Missing Money,’ Brookiugs Paj;ers on Leo—
noiltic _-‘scticilp (3:1976). pp. 683—730. One crucial difference
between Goidfcld’sevidence anti inure recent interpretations is
that Goldft’hI provided evidence of snstaiuetl one—sided ~iitiO~
muon crier. Logically, Goldfeld’s fiucliugs suggest a shift. More
recent discussions incorrectly deduce a slsift froni a single Pe-
riods simulation error. This point is sulsseqnentlv more frilly
developed. For a lilt)re red.eiit applit: atioil, see B r’aii NI otltv.
linios thou md Mont’ Dtm intl it dtid lit u itt B ink of S iii
Francisco ~ ce/c/u Letter (January 1, 1982).
“BstiInating equation I in n ati Ia] Ii ig (in I hsri n> i elds the lo! —
lowing coefficient estimatt-s and summary statistics for the 1/
1960—l\’/ I 979 sampIt- pt riot’ absoli te value of t—stati sties in
paret ItheSe 5 I:
1’) In (M/P)
1







where NI is Ml. Pi sthe GNPdeflator. v
1
is real GNP, and BC!’ is
the coin ntercial puller tate.
5
The t’stimated toe fEcient on In
(1)07) indicates that a I pt’teent ilscrcase in rt’a] intoni t- this
ciimiter is uslilt!] v assodiateci witi i a0.07 percent ins:reuse in reId
none’ hldanees. In a similar vein, the interest rate coefficient
suggests that a 1 percent increase in interest rates (icr example,
fretii 10.0 pereelit to 10.1 pt’revnO will Icad to a 11.0 1 peret’ n
dccliiit’ in real ha!ancci. 1ina]lv. fist’ coefficient on I aggt’tI rcal
halanct’s (0.851 indicates that rt’al balances willadjust to tlt’sirt’d
levels at a rate of 15 pereeot (1.00—0.85) per qsiartt’r. ‘I’hns, tht’
lot ig— run it: spiinst to changes in nte rest rates and real ill cttlilt’ i
Inneli laglit~ r than th t’ shot—rini rt’spoil st’ . In tlit’ 01 it—i if—SititipI
timul ation 5 reported ISe low, tlit’ it’ cueifit’ ct its a!ong reftIi act,ia I
salnes of the right—I ciisd sit!t’ s-a rial sIt) s art’ nst’tI Iii pri)f t’ct tlse
diepet tdent sariahlt’.
rins rclationslnp is iimni ar to that in H. NV. holler anti Scott E.
ELfin, ‘‘The Shnft in Mont’s Demand: What Really Ilappenetlf
tins Rei-icn.: (Ft’hrnan 1982h pp. 11—16. however, flit’ passbook
rate vanahle is t’xclntltd since its coefficient was insignificant.
The ta ~siat ion was e stialatedl us iiig the I -Iatanaka two—step pro—
ced urt tocorivet fi Jr first—I)idle r stena I corrt’ I ation in I lit’ nt’s i di nil
1)1 is a dnn,iny variable that takes ta, a value of I after 1/1974,
t:apttiriisg a 1)11c—ti ii it’ sit(ft in fite tiemat iti for nun it’ v. Tht’ s alt —
dard eito r of the estintate d rr’greisiott is0.0045 anti the e sti Inatt’
of tlsi~ 5 e rhtl corid) Iati ut i cueffic it’ lit is 0.35.
‘Tb ee qu atiois sinsnlatt’s fist’ isati iral log of real NI 1 I saltuted’s . PWI
1 presents flit’ antilog of tltt’se sinsnlatt’d values, that is, lt’vels of
rt’a I nsta 1ev I alance s . Such a traits fortnation, heing iioiil md’ kr,
‘viIInot violdopthlot] pre rIietiot is. hiowe vet-,it dtse si dcl aI i t’ttt’
‘‘feel’’ for tht’ size of errors.
Tht’st’ simulations art’ static (wht’it actual values of the htggt’d
tillI )t’l dtat variable art’ usted ratlst’r tlsan civilansic (when p nt—
dicted values of tIn’ laggetl dt’peudent variable are used). Ste
Sctttt F I—It iii D~ n tnut I isit t tst,nt intl tltt Di In tad lot
4
LLt2N.i..i ~ 01..::. .1981)
Much hoopla has been made’ of the difference
between the simulated real balances in the second
qtmarter tsf 1980 and the actual 1 alances at tlsat time.
Ilea~,noney balances in that period turned out to be
almost 87 billion below what equation 1’ predicted.
Such afinding has been interpreted as evidence’ that
inonc’y demand shifted downward sign ificantl vi n
11/1980.
When the deviations are consistently one—sided,
Isowever, one can e’oncl tide that a ‘‘shift’’ in the
behavioral relationship has occurred (i.e., one ofthe
coefficients, [lii, /3k, /32 or /33, has changed). Chart 2,
however, shows no evidence ofconsistent one—sided
errors. Thus, thc’re is little evidence front these
sinsulations to indicate a ‘‘shift’’ in the behavioral
re Iat imisIn!).
Moreover, recognize that if policvmakers incor-
rectly equate prediction errors with shifts in money
demand, then they will view any observed behayior
in real moneybalances as correct. Thus, in either the
ease of rapid or slow money growth, no corrective
action would be called for. however, if these dis-
turbances are not true shifts in money demand,
polievmakers will actually allow money gro\vtls to
fluctuate more tlsan necessary’.
Nloney,’’ this Rerictc (junt’/ July 1980), pp. 13—23, where it is
argo t’d ti atstatic forecast t’rnors pa ni de a lit’tter fti, n idatii at frot ii
svlsi c’ls to jridge sitills in the (It-ittand for mull t’y
5
T Is is is tn ic rega dltess isf tht’ size’ tA tisee mo r, ht’caoSe titt’ rt’ is
alwitvsa posit iSr prohahi lit>- of drawing hoin tist’ t’xI a’lilt’ tails tsf
a normal prohabi] it> distribution,
an empirical relationship such as equatiois 1 siniti—
lates or predicts actual real money balances beyond
the estimation period.~Chart 2 plots the level ol’real
money balances simulated with equation 1 and the
actual real money balances for the out—of—sample
mterval 1/198()_1/1982.6 Table 1 summarizes these
results using a variet of statistical measures.7
5/Ill/I/I/till) cx: >-s•-~ t~l/ .14/))’ //) /1
Equating a ‘‘shift’’ with a simulation error, how-
ever, is clearly inappropriate. i)eyiations of’ real
balances from predicted or simulated values (It) not
provide evidence of a helsavioral shift its the re Ia—
tionsls ip. Recall that when the equation isestimated,
it is assumed that actual real money balances \viII
fluctuate random 11/ arol md its predicted or simu—
lated level. By assumption, tlseactual and simulated
real money balaisc’es \viII usually deviate from each
other by some unknown random value. Tlst,s, we
should expect similar fluctuations to occur out—oh
sample. When considering only one simulation
error, it is i npossible to ascertain whether one is
observing a shift (as represented by a change in
one of’ the coefficients), or s implv a large nmdlomn
fluetuation.~
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Chart 2
Actual and Simulated Real M~
/-.;*e,:~~)c~/./.>:f,, ;%ThnednOcI.csc/nc) :~Is//•)
Few who argue that a shift oc-c:urred in 11/1980
base their case on the one simulation error of chart2,
however. ist’o auxiliary arguments also are used to
support thde msotion that there was a downshift in
mnoue> demand. One argument is that a downshift
occurred ‘‘in response to the vd’rv high and record
levels of short—term interest rates reached in early
spring.’’9 This argmimnent holds that a sharp rise in
interest rates, especially one that pushes rates
lievondl previous peaks, causes firms and individuals
to institute new cash managemc’nt teehn idftmes.iO
t;kxilmtiti antI Li,td-ev, ‘‘h’4’dt’ral Rest’rvt- Sr-stoat littpleittt’istatmisn
of Nlouetarv i
t
oI icy,’’ p. 251.
i~( )m it- of tlmt’ earlit’st espon sal s of tltis itvpotltc’ iii c-liti ht’ loan ci in
Ric-ls ndI). Punter, Tl,ontas I). Siitspsoms, and Eilct’n Nlanikispi,
I-mit lad’ A Ltntis ittuit mci flit \io,tt tie, -Nc,u,mts_itt’, Bum
t
These techniques, omice ut place, leatl to perillaltd’nt
tlet’rec,ses in desired real money balances relative to
a given level of real income and interest rates. In
otlser words, money densandi shifts downward fbI—
lowing a sharp rise in interest rates. Suds an argu—
men t has been used to explain tbe abnormal be-
haviorofntonev demand since 1974 and is used now
to bolster Elide evidence of atsother downshift.
Chart 2proves false this explanation of the 11/1980
decline itt real balancees. Were there actually a
decline iii the demand for real cash balances causedl
by individuals tunl firms instituting new cash man-
agement techniques in response to high interest
rates, one should observe a level of real money
balances that is con-s-i-s-tentIp below simulatedl levels
following the ‘‘downshift.’’
tugs Po;sccs tin Eciousunc At-/icily (1:1979). ~s. 213-29.
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Table 1
Out-of-Sample Simulations of a Money
Demand Equation (billions of dollars,
seasonally adjusted)
Actual Simulated
Date (M/P) (M/Pi) Error
1/1980 $230 1 $230 1 0.0
11/1980 223.0 2298 —68
111/1980 2258 2219 3.9
IV/1980 226.2 2260 02
1/1981 2235 226.4 .9
11/1981 2252 22 7 5
1111981 220.1 2255 54
1V1981 218.3 2195 —12
1982 2219 218 37
SummaryStatisttcs
Mean error’ 06717
Mean absolute error 2 9621
Root-mean aqua ed error 36635
hei inequa ty coefficien , 00164




‘Ac uai less ,mulated
If tIns shift were pc’rmamtemtt, as this argument
ii iggests, the predictiomm error should remain nega—
tn-c for all quartd’rs after 11/1980. Chart 2 slton’s,
however, tltat the equation does izo t c-ohs istcntlv
overpredict real balamices after 11/1980. Actual real
halamtces in 111/1980, instead. were slightly higher
thamt the relationship wouitl suggest. Rurtlser, real
balamtces werde slightly higher, nit ax-erage, tltlm the
equation implies for the full Ill/I 980—1/1982 period.
-flists, one cannot empirically si ipport the argument
that a persistemmt, sizable diownslnft iii money dcc—
mnanch was prc-ecipitatedl by rd’cord intd’rest rates in
11/1980.
The secottd arguntent in support of’ a money
diemamsd dowmmsls i 11 in 11/1980 comttemids that tlte ins-
ptis itiomm of credit control iii NIarch 1980 was rc—
spotisible fbr a decrease in dlesired meal halamtces.
Such itt argumc’mst ccsntrachicts ecotstmnc theory,
hosvever. With crediit cdimmtrols explicitly Iitnitiag the
extetts ion of batik credit, individual.s amid busimiess
32
firitis \vouldh des ire lam’ger muonev balamtces for antic-
ipated transactions or precatmtionary’pumrposes . ‘Ihtus,
theory’ sumggests amt increase imi mone demamid
chumring this period, not a dhecrc-ase
Thus, both auxil iarv argumtmen ts in favor of a be-
havioral shift iii money deniamtd in 11/1980 lack
reitlier logical foundation or supportive emmmpirical
evidence. Moreover, if there \vas a heh avioral shift
itt atone>- dlemand, the excess supply’ (sumpply ex-
ceeding demand) of mnonev nntst have lieen offset by
an increase in densand elsewhere. In other worc!s, if
economnic partieipaitts actuallv wanted less mnone>-
balanc’es, the> must has-c desired more of’ somuetlnmtg
else imi exchammge. There is little evidence, however.
of immcreased dentand fur labor, goods auth servic’t-es , or
finamicial assets in the ed:onomnv.
Ftmrtlter, the generally dcclimung imitere-st rates Pt
thiis period do mmot miecessaril suggc’st a behas-iorah
diowmislnft ut money deniammd as many insist. Dc—
dining interest rates did) suggest an excess supply of
credit, whiich can conic about either because of’ an
incre-’ase in credit supply or a clecrc’ase in crc’clit
deniandi. Only an increase in tIme supply of credit(as
imtdli\’idtials become more wi I hug to gis’e sip mtioney
today in exchange for a promitise of’ mtionev iii time
fmiture) wonId be consistent witlt the muotion of a
dow-mmshift imi momiev dlemtiatid in 11/1980, simice there
is no es-idcttce of an incrdeased dlemnaitdl elsewhere
which ss’ould be required tts offset the decreased
demand fUr hot/i credlit andf mone>-. Yet, thereap—
pears little evidence ofan increased1 supply ofcredht
ia tIns period. Chart 3 shows tImat the total funds
raisech by nonfittancial sectors clet’Iined mnarkedlv ut
11/1980. Tliuis, tIn’ fnhl in rates iii the sec’omt~iqmmarter
of 1980 is bc’tter explainedl hr n’c-akening credlit
demmtands associatedl xvi tim the recess iomt, rather tItan
the imicreasedi supply of credht.
I — C 4 14 ‘- C
Ii tiiottte>’ dhematmd dud1 tiot sItu It in 11/1980, why
were real tnoney bahautces Iow relatix-e to predicted
levels? Perhaps the irregular behavior ucctirred isti
the supply side.’ Robert W’eintramih has suggested,
fUr exantpie, that slow money gros-vtii resulted h’omn
an unexpected decline in the mttouey omit]tipl icr (the
ratio csf NI 1 balances to the mouetarv base), its cc—
spomise’ to a sizable shift in the desired currency
holdings, as comIsmutters becattte syarv abstsutt the
acceptability tsf cm’ctht cards diin ng the control pe-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1982
Chart 3
Credit Market Funds Raised by Nonfinancial Sectors
riodl.h1 Snmch a chiautge would drive tip the currermcy—
deposit ratio amtd reduce the momtev mnultiphier.
If thte money nrmuhtiplier declines, banks have to
reduce the amount ofdeposits they create fora given
antomumit of source base (or hank reserves) According
to \-Veimttraub’s hypothesis, N-hi balances dhechined
hec’ammse nnonetar>-’ atmthtonities did not anticipate the
increased deunand fUr currency autd offset it h in-
creasing the base. Therefore, the ohserveeh declimte
in realmoney balances was clue, not toa redtmction in
the deiimund for real balances, but to this unantici-
patedh change in thue supply of ittottey causedh by an
increased demnand for curremtcv as a result of the
credit comitrols.
Rtsbeit \Vc imttnau Is, J/mc mi‘cict oft/ic Fcc/c “a/ B d’-itnt’ Sijs-remit ‘-s
iltamerc,rui Ptmlicic.s- aim f/ic \di/iisa’.s Eccmuoumy (Sccdsmtdl ttteptirt),
Staff Rt.’port of tin- Suiscommsmmmittr’r’ mi I)omtmc’stic Nlisuetarv
Ituhcv, iloase Ccttuunttce nit Baukimmg, Fiaamscc aimd Urltait
Affiurs, 96 Cuitg. 2 Sess, (Covcritnient Pnimitiitg Office, iySOi, ~s
t7,
Abthotmgh indhivieluahs wanted to hold as mruch, if
not mnore, N-hi balances following the imposition of
tite credit comutrols, the banking systemn precludled
these clemamtchs fromti heing satisfied. Ottce crechit
cotttrohs \vere remnoved. thte Weimttraub hypothesis
snmggc-ests, tlse mttultiphier would comtte hack withtin its
historical ranges (see’ chart 4). Tbtus, real mttoutey
balances could he expected to return to more ltis—
torical levels as well. ‘l’his is immdeeehwhat happemted:
actual real halamtces rose to about $226 hilliomt in
111/1980 (see chart 2).
Therefore, one camt interpret the heltavior ofreal
balances imi 11/1980 as evidence of a supply—side
limitation, not a ehdccrease imi thte demttamtd for money.
lii this Ii ghtt, the large simttulatiou error is merely
evidemice of temnporary’ dlisequihihriumn. Real mttotmey
balances deviated fromn predicted levels, miot be-
cause individuals desired hess money’, htit because
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Chart 4




credit cotttrols on the xvav people decided to htold
tIn-cir monev.
joInt Judd amt~i JoInt Scaddimig alsd) argue that ‘‘tlte
rapid monetary dleceleration in the secou(I qmtarterof
1980 (as well as the rapidlgrowth imttlte’ first ammd thirdh
quarters) was caused, miot by a nionev-dc’,i;anti shill,
hut by a miioney-silp/)if/ ‘shock’ “t2 \Vhs i he disagree-
iimg xv itlm Weintramml ahuut the mccliattics of’ tbtc.
supply sltock (jtmdhd amid Scaddhing trace tlsd’ snmpplv
shtock to the commtrac’tiois in hank loamss that followed
iZjuItit P. jamlmi tatmi John I’ Sm-amlilfug. ‘‘L~i1siitty\Iamitigcmtum’at,
Batik laamis. amtmi Dc-posit ‘Market’ i)fst’qufiflmnitmue’’ 1”cmlt’rai
Resm’t-’,t- Bammk of Samt t”rttiuc’ism’um, Lc-c’ocm,ah- Rci-icu- iSumuuuer
1980, is- 21.
the’ Spe’ciah Credit Coittrol Program of’ 1980), jti~hel
amid Scadhdhing, like’ Weimttraub, recognize’ timat
“changes imt the -nf;ppip ofmooney can choistimmate short-
nut ittove’mtte’ttts ims the- moutctarv aggre’gates ~ flte’
important poimtt he-re is not to dhifferemttiate between
the’ We imttrauh attdh Jtmdd—Scaehding hvpothseses , bitt
to recognize’ that both \-iews explant the contrac’tiots
in ittomiey growth by supply-sidle occurrences. Thus,
de’viatiomis of actual real balances fm-om thsose’ siimtut—
lateeh by a money demtiamtd equation ittoy be ex’idence
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THE NATIONWIDE “NOW”
EXPERIENCE IN 1981: ANOTHER
SHIFT?
The simulated values ofrealmoneybalances also
allow an evaluationofthe impact ofthe nationwide
legalization of NOW accounts on the demand for
money. Ithas been argued thatthe introduction of
NOW accountsmight resultin an increased demand
for Ml balances, supposedly because ofthe explicit
interest paid on such balances.14
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
apparently believed such a resultlikely. In the first
place, the FOMC increased the targeted growth
ranges for Ml balances in 1981. In addition,the staff
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors devel-
oped a “shift-adjusted” Ml measure that would
subtractthe “artificially induced” demandresulting
from the nationwideintroduction ofNOW accounts.
This adjustment was determined, in large part, by
surveyingnew NOW account depositors about the
originalsourceofthefunds theydeposited intothese
accounts. Askingsucha question, however, provides
little, if any, infonnation about desired money
holdings’5 An analysis of a conventional money
demand relationship should be a better vehicle to
address this issue.
Ifthe nationwide legalization of NOW accounts
had actually resulted in an increased desire to hold
Ml balances, the conventionalmoney demand rela-
tionship should have consi.s’tently underpredicted
real balances after the nationwide introduction of
these accounts. In other words, actual (real) Ml
balances should have been consistently above the
levelsimulated by the equation, as individualsheld
“Much ofthe discussion aboutthe impactol’NOW accounts has
centered on the minimum balance requiremnents of such ac-
counts. Since minimnuimi balance requiremnents are higher on
NOW accounts than on conventional demnand deposits, it has
been argued that Ml will grow. David E. Lindsey, “Nonbor-
rowed Reserve Targeting and Monetary Control,” paper pre-
sented at Economic PolicyConference on “Improving Money
Stock Control: Problems, Solutions, and Consequences,” has
correctly pointed out, however, that the issue is one ofmoney
demand. No adjustment need he made if the demand for Ml
remains unchanged.
m$5ee John A.Tatoni, “Recent Financial Innovations: Have They
Distorted the Meaning of Ml?” thmis Review (April 1982), pp.
23-35. Some have argued that the shift adjustmentwas (level-
opedto capturethesouwesofNOWinflows ratherthamitheuses.
Such an adjustment should not have been incorporated in the
targeting ofthe immoney aggregates then!
larger-than-expected balances. In chart 2, where
observed (not shift-adjusted) real money balances
are shown, however, no consistent underprediction
occurred during the last five quarters. In fact, the
equation slightlyoverpredicts real money balances.
Thus, it does not appear that the nationwide legal-
ization of NOW accounts increased desired Ml
balances in any important way.1’
CONCLUSiON
Many analysts of monetary policy have used the
recent financial innovations and the volatility of
money growth as ammunition against pre-estab-
lished monetary growth targets. These innovations
supposedly have caused unpredictable swings in
money demand. The behavior of actual money
growth has been taken as evidence ofsuch swings.
This article offers a counter argument. To begin
with, swings in money growtharereliable indicators
ofmoney demandonly to theextentthatthe supply
ofmoney has not itselfbeen shocked. In the face of
such shocks, large fluctuations in money growth
cannotbe interpreted asevidence ofmoney demand
shifts.The second quarter of1980was an episodeof
unusual money growth caused, not by shifting
money demand, but rather by supply-side occur-
rences. Ml balances fellbecause thebanking system
was unable to support the public’s desired deposit
levels. The lesson learned from this episode is that
‘While no apparent irregularities existwhen Ml is used, this is
not the case when the shift-adjusted measure is employed.
Many have recognized this fact. See, for example, Motley,
“Innovation amid Money Demnand;” and John Wenninger,
Lawrence Radecki and Elizabeth hammond, “Recent insta-
bility inthe Demand forMoney,” Federal ReserveBankofNew
York Quarterly Iteriew (Sunimner 1981), pp. 1-9, where many
explanations of such anomalous behavior are provided. The
pointofthe present article, however, is that such explanations
are not required. A punle exists only when the questionable
shift-adjusted mneasure is used. Just because individuals are
movingfunds front savings toNOWaccounts does notindicate,
as the sbift-adjustmnent procedure suggests,that snore MI bal-
ances aredesired. Thereare always people niovingfunds from
savings accoummts todemand deposits. Such movementof fmnids,
however, have never before been taken to suggest that the
demnand depositmeasure should be adjusted. Whyshould such
movementsoffunds now provideanymoreuseful infonnation?
While it Is clearly possible that the Introduction of explicit
interest paymmments on checkable deposits did result in an in-
creased demand for Ml balances,surveyingindividuals toAnd
outwhere funds fornew NOWaccounts camne fromn is not going
to be useful in addressing such an issue- Examining a money
demand equation, whiclm is a useful procedure,shows no evi-
dence ofan increased deniand.
35one-time deviations of real money balances from
predicted levels donotnecessarily indicateashift in
money demand. Such a deviation couldjust as well
denote a temporary money market disequilibrium,
caused by the growth ofthe money supply or a ran-
dom fluctuation,
Onepreconditionfora“shift” in money demandis
a setof consistent, one-sided prediction errors, de-
rived from an estimated money demand relation-
ship. A conventional money demand equation,
however, shows evidence of neither sustained pe-
riods of overprediction (a downshift) nor sustained
periods of underprediction (an upshift) in the
underlying empirical relationship, Thus, while sig-
nifleant financial innovations have occurred in the
last two years, there is little evidence that these
innovations resulted in money demand shifti. The
Ml measure continues to have significantecononiic
and policy content.
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